In the past six months (November 2024 – April 2025), much has changed and stirred in Serbia—but not the reforms tied to its EU integration. This is the main conclusion of the new prEUgovor Alarm Report.
The collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy on 1 November 2024 revealed that the consequences of corruption, politicised institutions, and dysfunctional oversight can be fatal and anyone can fall victim. Citizens began to gather spontaneously to pay tribute to the victims and demand accountability.
The authorities responded with the usual mechanisms of a captured state—denial of responsibility, distortion and concealment of facts, control over the media, blatant concentration of power and institutional abuse, both covert and overt pressure on the judiciary, a pompous and selective fight against corruption, escalating repression against protestors and all government critics, and the creation of parallel support structures to replace every social group that expressed dissent. Each of these actions only intensified public outrage, and the protests grew increasingly massive, spreading like wildfire across Serbia.
Citizens have seen through the mechanisms of state capture - which we have documented in previous Alarm reports - and have clearly risen in opposition. The protests have been led by university students in Serbia, who have been blocking their faculties since late 2024, demanding that institutions fulfill their duties.
Nothing has changed in the government’s approach to the reforms it committed to under the EU accession negotiations and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Both the previous and the new government continue to promise full fulfilment of all benchmarks by the end of 2026, yet none of their actions justify such optimism—quite the opposite.
Although the European Commission and the Serbian government focused on implementing the priority measures from the Reform Agenda adopted in October 2024, even this process faced significant delays. By the end of April, very little had been done in the “Fundamentals” cluster—and what was done was largely inadequate. Civil society expressed dissatisfaction with the action plans on anti-corruption and gender-based violence. Disappointed, representatives of the opposition and relevant organisations withdrew from the Working Group on Electoral Reform.
Ambitious deadlines for amendments to laws and the adoption of public policy documents set in the Reform Agenda in the area of ‘Basics’ proved unrealistic. There were no significant systemic changes in the field of gender equality. The Law on Gender Equality is still under suspension, with no announcement as to when the opinion of the Constitutional Court could be expected. In February 2025, the AP for 2025 for the implementation of the Strategy for Gender Equality 2021-2030 was finally adopted. Despite numerous promotional activities, there are no visible effects of the work of the Minister without portfolio in charge of coordinating activities in the field of gender equality, prevention of violence against women, and women’s economic and political empowerment. Gender equality is not mentioned in the Declaration of Position paper of the new mandate holder, while women’s rights are linked to patriarchal values (because women are “the source of life, the strength of the family and the foundation of our community”). Although the mandate holder said that “any violence against women deserves strongest condemnation”, he did not react to the sexual harassment allegations of female students against the Minister of Education, who is a professor at the Faculty of Teachers.
The question is whether a serious systemic fight against gender-based violence against women is possible in a violent context that is constantly intensifying, especially when the government actively undermines trust in institutions (primarily in the police and the Prosecutor’s Office). The AP for the period 2024-2025 was prepared for the Strategy for preventing and combating gender-based violence against women and domestic violence 2021-2025, but the public debate on this document went unnoticed. However, there is no such document on the website of the competent Ministry, nor was the process of its creation participatory. Despite the lower number of women that were killed in the partner-family context, the lack of recognition of the risks and the lack of protection for women who previously reported serious violence is worrying. The state’s response to reports of sexual harassment and digital violence is completely inadequate. Even reports of obstetric violence are not receiving an appropriate reaction from the authorities, while court proceedings are long and without an epilogue. The policy of (lack of) financing of specialised services for women who experienced violence provided by women’s organisations in Serbia has not changed.
The coalition calls on EU institutions and officials to improve communication with Serbian citizens, deliver consistent messages, and respond more decisively to alarming developments and the lack of reforms in the country.
You can view the ALARM Report by the prEUgovor coalition HERE.
You can watch the recording of the prEUgovor conference:
